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Operation Dismantle, Inc. et al. v. Her Majesty The 
Queen1: The Application of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms to Prerogative Powers.
IN T R O D U C T IO N
O peration Dismantle, Inc.2 sought a declaration stating that the Ca­
nadian governm ent's decision to allow the testing of American cruise mis­
siles over C anadian airspace was a violation of the public’s right to “. . . life, 
liberty and security of the person," as guaranteed  by section 7 of the Ca­
nadian C harter of Rights and Freedoms. T he  Crown unsuccessfully a t­
tem pted to have the statem ent of claim struck out, for not disclosing a 
cause of action, in the motion heard  before Cattanach J. of the Federal 
C ourt o f C anada, Trial Division.'* T h e  C row n’s appeal was allowed In the 
Federal C ourt of Appeal—all five Justices there finding no justiciable cause 
of action. Leave to appeal was granted by the Suprem e C ourt of C anada 
which reserved decision on February 14, 1984.
At trial, Cattanach J. found a “scintilla of a cause of action." holding 
that it was enough to allow the tase to Ik* heard. He alluded to tin* "cardinal 
principle of long standing” which sustains a statem ent of claim if its alle­
gations of fact are. In virtue of a wide in terpre tation , capable of supporting 
a cause of action.' In ultimately deciding that O peration Dismantle, Im . 
had failed to disclose a cause of action, the Court of Appeal considered 
several questions of law concerning the C harter. First of all. the allegations 
that the testing would incite nuclear attack were term ed as "apprehended  
infringements'' and hence, were lu-ld to Ik * outside the ambit of the Charter. ’ 
Bv virtue of section 24( I ). the C harter is applicable onlv where rights "have 
been” denied.
Secondly, since the alleged nuclear attack would be the ad  of a foreign 
power, the C Charter did not a p p l\ . Section .‘Vi of the ( Charter t learlv protec is 
people from violations which em anate from governm ents in C anada but 
not from  foreign governm ents, o r for th.it m atter, from  private individuals.
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Thirdly, and separate from  the C harter argum ents, the testing agree­
m ent was a policy decision, the appropriateness o f which is open for debate 
in ou r society, and therefore , indeterm inable. Since the issue was non- 
justiciable, there  was no cause o f action in the statem ent o f claim.
Finally, O peration Dismantle, Inc. succeeded in getting the majority 
o f the C ourt o f Appeal to declare that the action o f the federal governm ent, 
in making the agreem ent, was the exercise o f  a prerogative power which 
is subject to the C harter by virtue o f section 32(1) (a):
:V2( 1 ) T his Charter applies
(a) to the Parliament and governm ent of Canada in respect of all 
matters within the authority of Parliament . . .
T he prerogative is the panoply o f exceptional powers given to the 
Crown. Such powers are ‘d irect’, in effecting the will o f the sovereign, or 
‘incidental’, in merely excluding the Crown from  the law as it applies to 
his subjects. T h e  direct prerogatives deal with the C row n’s character, in­
come and authority. T h e  ‘charac ter’ o f the sovereign is exemplified by 
maxims such as “T h e  King can do  no w rong”. For all practical purposes, 
the royal income prerogative has been su rrendered  up for public use. 
Finally, the royal authority  includes the royal prerogative to exercise func­
tions o f state, such as: to declare war. o r for o u r purpose, to make treaties.6
T h e  question arose, at the C ourt o f Appeal level, w hether or not the 
term  ‘governm ent’, found in section 32(1 )(a), renders the prerogative sub­
ject to the C harter. Pratte, Ryan and LeDain J J. gave section 32 just such 
a literal in terpretation  in holding that the prerogative is subject to the 
C harter.7 However, in the C ourt o f A ppeal’s lengthiest decision, Marceau 
J. held that an essential characteristic o f the ‘roval prerogative’ was that it 
be exercised independently  from  the possibility o f review by the courts. 
M oreover, in legislating the C harter, Parliam ent could not have “. . . with­
out a clearer indication o f their intention . . .” meant the prerogative to be 
subject to the C h arter.8 In light o f  what is, ef fectively, a narrow  3:1 decision 
on this point, it becomes im perative for the Suprem e Court o f C anada to 
p ro ffer a solution.
APPREHENDED INFRINGEMENTS
In addressing the question w hether o r not the C harter offered p ro ­
tection for a m ere anticipated breach of section 7, Cattanach J. drew an 
analogy between a possible nuclear attack resulting from the tests and the 
facts of R\lands v. Fletcher.“ In that case it *as deem ed foiseeable that a
'’Kail Jot* it I . I hr D ii Inm an  of English I.au ( L o n d o n  Sweet X: Maxwell ,  I {M 'l)  al p  IIWO.
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large body of w ater forceably retained on on e’s land could, by accident 
spill onto an o th er’s land. By analogy, the provocation o f a nuclear attack 
m ade possible by the decision to iiiow the testing could be “stigmatised”
because o f . . its forseeable harm ful potentialities.....  T he  analogy was
not com m ented upon by the C ourt c f  Appeal which was content to literally 
in terpret section 24(1):"
24(1) A nyone w hose rights or free- 24(1) T ou te  personne. vie tim e de  
doms, as guaranteed bv this Charter, violation ou  de negation des droits 
have been inf ringed or den ied  n m  ou liberies que lui sont garantis par 
applv . . .  la presente Charte jk-ih s’addres-
ser . . .
Hence, M arceau ). was able to conclude that: “ It is impossible to think 
that the C ourts can be called upon to deal with m ere potential situa­
tions . . .
With reference to the French version, it is easy to see that “victime de’ 
does not connote the past tense, as does “have been”. Because section 57 
o f the Constitution A rt, 1981 states that English and French versions are of 
equal authority, it is m aintainable that the French version does applv to 
“apprehended  inf ringem ents’”. T h e  denial o f  the t ight to education in one's 
own official language, which the Quel>ec governm ent ef f ected with its Charte 
de Langur Eran^aise1 \  was referred  to in Quebec Assonation of Protestant School 
Boards et al. v. Quebec et al. (no. 2 )."
Even though the school vear had not yet begun, and therefo re no i igln 
had been’ violated, Deschenes C.J.S.C. in terpreted  Quebec's firmlv en u n ­
ciated policy as an existing infringem ent to the right lo an English ed u ­
cation .1’ With respect to the C h arte r’s reach, Deschenes C.J.S.C. reviewed 
ih t authorities and concluded that: ". . . it is in o rd e r to extend the scope 
of s.24 to the fu tu re  ¿is to the past.”1" Notwithstanding the argum ent that 
the French version of section 24(1) would applv to anticipated breaches, 
case law suggests ¿hat the English version would also apply. In Re Allman 
and Commissioner of Northwest TerritoriesIT, De W eerdt J. re ferred  to the 
English version onl\ and concluded that it was prohahh applicable onl\ to
"’IVi ( attanac li | .,  |> H
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m  ap p lu . i t i o n .  leads  o n e  to Im4m*vi- th a t P a r l i am e n t  in t e n d e d  sect ion  21(1)  to  l»c app l icab le  in  I n l i n e
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past events: . . although f u tu re  consideration in an appropriate  case may 
suggest otherw ise.” IH
It seems p ro p er that fu tu re  inf ringem ents should be protected under 
section 24(1). As Professor Gibson puts it: “. . . in most inchoate situations 
the th reat o f  a fu tu re  violation o f rights has immediate restrictive conse­
quences on the activities o f the plaintiff.”19 Hence, if the testing had caused 
panic in anticipation o f a nuclear attack, similar to that which occurred in 
the United States after the governm ent’s decision to blockade Cuba in 1962, 
this would represent a violation to the security o f the person. It is suggested 
that the Federal C ourt o f  Appeal was hasty in stating that the p lain tiffs 
allegations, if true, were outside the contem plation o f the C harter.
THREATS FROM A FOREIGN POWER
Even if app rehended  infringem ents are protected, the fact that any 
threat to the security of the person would em anate from  a foreign power 
invalidates O peration Dismantle, Inc.’s claim. With reference to section 
32(1), it is obvious that no protection is afforded  to rights violated by the 
action o f any body o ther than a governm ent in Canada:
:V2( 1) T his Charter applies  
.1 ) to the Parliament and governm ent of Canada . . .
This literal in terpretation  o f the C harter was brought to bear by Steele 
J. of the O ntario  High C ourt:
Sec tion 32 provides that the Charter is applicable to the Parliament and 
G overnm ent of Canada and the Legislature and G overnm ent of each prov­
ince. In mv op in ion , noth ing therein applies to a foreign State . .
In the present case, Hugessen J. goes fu rth e r bv illustrating that the 
C harter is inapplicable to cases involving the inf ringem ents caused by other 
private parties:
1 he Charter cannot have such a reach. It it d id . the tim orous citi/.en 
who feared .t m ugging on the street m ight enjoin the police to provide him  
with a continuous escort.'1
While this line of reasoning is unassailable, it is not unreasonable to 
conceive the* testing as the act of the C anadian governm ent, and thus, allow 
the* cause of action to survive. If the Hylands v. Fletcher reasoning is used.
'"Ibid . a I 17(1.
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it is foreseeable that retaliation o f  some sort would result from  an openly 
belligerent action o f the C anadian governm ent, which the cruise missile 
tests may o r may not be. Indeed , M arceau J. suggested that, if O peration 
Dismantle, Inc. had tightened the causal connection by stating that the tests 
created a . state o f vulnerability, not the nuclear attack itse lf . . the 
cause would have survived.
JUSTICIABILITY
Section 24 provides standing to persons who, at com m on law, would 
not have a cause o f a c t i o n . “Any person” who claims that a right has been 
denied, can invoke the C harte r for protection. However, if the issue is not 
capable o f being addressed by the judiciary, there  can be no standing given 
and no cause o f action can exist. Only where the case is justiciable, therefore, 
will the court exercise its discretion to grant standing to a person who seeks 
a decision o f  governm ent struck down as unconstitutional:
C e n t r a l  to  ( th e  e x e r c i s e  o f )  t h e  d i s c re t io n  is t h e  just iciabilitv of  t h e  issue  
s o u g h t  t o  be  r a i s e d .24
Because the cabinet decision to allow the tests was ‘policy’ m ade in the 
nation’s best interest, and therefore debatable, no court could dec ide whether 
it was beneficial o r harm ful. Ryan |. suggested that all governm ental de ­
cisions are m ade in good faith and that:
T h e  a c c u ra c y  of t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  e s t im a te  of  w h a t  n a t io n a l  securi tv  
a n d  n a t io n a l  d e f e n c e  r e q u i r e  is, of c o u r s e ,  o p e n  to  d e b a t e  in o u r  society, 
a n d  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  is r e s p o n s i b l e  fo r  th e i t  d e c i s io n s  u n d c t  t h e  p r in c ip le  
o f  r e s p o n s ib l e  g o v e r n m e n t .  B u t  c a n  t h e  l i g h t n e s s  o r  w r o n g n e s s  of t h e n  
d e c i s io n  to  p e r m i t  t e s t in g  be  p r o v e d  111 a c o u r t  c a s e '
LeDain J similarly dismisses the case for its inherently non-justiciable 
issues which depended  upon:
. . .  a n  in f in i ty  of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  m il i ta rv  a n d  d ip lo m a t i c ,  t e c h n ic a l .  p sveho-  
logical  a n d  m o r a l ,  a n d  of  d e c i s io n s ,  t e n ta t i v e  o r  f inal ,  whic h a r e  th e m s e lv e s  
p a r t  a s s e s s m e n t s  of  fact  a n d  p a r t  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a n d  h opes .-"
Admittedly, courts frequently  . . confuse issues of standing with the- 
substantive m erits o f a case . . .”JT However, if the disc retion to allow stand­
ing rests on justiciability,*8 O peration  Dismantle. Inc. has no standing to
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and draiimg . .”
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challenge the decision. Clearly they cannot su rm ount this obstacle before 
the Suprem e C ourt. Even if we accept the view that section 24 gives au­
tomatic standing to such cases,29 the trial would en d  shortly, when the 
judge(s) decide(s) that the case cannot be judicially addressed.
PREROGATIVE
T h e  cruise missile testing was provided for by an “um brella” agreem ent 
with the United States. Despite the simple, and perhaps purposely neutral 
term , “agreem ent”, its legal character is that of a treaty which was intended 
to bind the parties in international law.™ While section 132 of the Consti­
tution Act, 1867 gave C anada the power to ratify treaties, the treaty-m aking 
power came from  the prerogative. Section 9 o f the Constitution Act, 1867 
vested the executive governm ent in the Crown: “U n d er this system, the 
treaty-m aking power belongs exclusively to the Crown. It is part o f the 
royal Prerogative . . .”31 Great Britain “progressively transferred” this power 
to the executive o f  the C anadian governm ent. C anada’s increased in ter­
national presence du ring  and after W orld W ar I precipitated  an enhanced 
executive power which flowed from  the Im perial C onference o f 1926, the 
Statute o f  W estminister, 1931, the Seals Act, 1939 and  the Letters Patent 
o f 1947. T hese Letters Patent explicitly delegated the prerogative powers 
o f the Crown to the G overnor General in Council, which for o u r purposes 
is the Prime M inister and his cabinet.1*
However plausible this explanation seems, th ere  are  alternative the­
ories to explain the derivation o f treaty-m aking power. It is possible to 
to rtu re the language of section 132 (im plem entation power) and come up 
with a source for the treaty-m aking power. Furtherm ore , such a power 
could rest in the residual “peace, o rd e r and good governm ent” clause of 
section 91 in the Constitution Act, 1867.™ However, the accepted theory 
assigns the power to the prerogative category. M arceau J. in the present 
case outlined the natu re  o f the royal prerogative:
1 he idea that certain privileges, f reedom s and pow ers rem ained directl\ 
associated with the dignity and responsibility of the Crown persisted even  
after the roval authority had becom e totally subject to the supremacy of 
Parliament, except that these roval prerogatives were then seen as arising  
out of the com m on law and their content, not defined  a priori, becam e subject 
to the will of the elected representatives ot the people , tree to intervene at 
any tim e to clarify their content or limit their ex ten t.'4
-"'Protessoi (>ihson ili I am op o lsk s  He B eau d oin , supra, at
I h i' view rests on  the assertion  that the d rafters ot the section w ere aw are ot th e  dis» re tio n a n  t .u tn i. hut 
(iid not m en tion  it anvw here in the C harter. I his om ission  su p p osed h  g ives autom ata standing to "am  
person", w hich is 111 line with the liberalisation o l the requirem ent h etore  th e  C harter, e g .  an von e with 
a gen u in e m leiest"  as fou n d  ili M inistri »/ /  usili r ii un I \ Humushi ( 1981 ). I HO 1)1 R i M ) T>HS (S.C C.)
'"Peter W llo g g . ( .onslilutunuil I m i  of (.muido ( lo r o n to  ( arsw ell. 1977) at IMI
''A  ja to tm  M illette. /  ira h  In a  in (a n a tta  (Ottawa l m \ o l Ottawa l’ress. 1975) at ,V2
',llbui , at r>4.
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It seems then, that until the legislature moves to carve out an area 
from  this reservoir of powers, the prerogative remains purely executive in 
nature. W hether this makes the cabinet secretive in its dealings, or w hether 
there is a need for speed in international affairs, very few treaties are 
ratified by Parliament. Indeed, of the four hun d red  and ninety-four bi­
lateral treaties signed between 194b and 1965, only fifty-two were presented 
to Parliam ent for ratification.r’ Professor Hogg expresses no doubt that 
the addition of the word "governm ent” to “Parliam ent and legislature” in 
section 32(1) (a) was m eant to allow application to the C harter to common 
law powers, such as ". . . the acquisition and m anagem ent of property, in 
contracting, in the issue of passports and in the aw ard ol some appo in t­
ments and honours.” ’" With respect to treaties, Ryan J. saw no problem in 
applying the C harter:
Both treaty making and defence  are matters within the authoritv ol 
Parliament in that Parliament could legislate in relation to them and to the 
use of the prerogative in respect to foreign affairs and d efence is “within 
the authority of Parliam ent” so that the Charter could apply to it.'7
LeDain J. affirm ed this point o f view:
A matter which is subject to the prerogative of the drow n in tight of 
Canada is one on which Parliament mav legislate so as to restra t or displace 
the prerogative . . ., and as such, is in mv opin ion a matter within the <iu- 
thoritv of Parliament.'"
However. Marceau J. contended that in the* absence of Parliament s 
clear indication, the C harter did not applv to tlu- roval prerogative, lo  
subject the roval prerogative to the C harter would rob n of its autonom ous 
operation and independence from  the courts. I he- Honourable |ustice 
could not admit that such an effect could be- clone so inclnec11\ In Parlia­
m ent.*1 With all due respec t to M arceau ).. the Chat tel has put pot ted to 
change the Constitution on o ther fundam ental points. I he- guarantees w tilt 
respect to the adm inistration of justice (ss. X-13); language rights ( ss .  I f- 
23); cultural rights (s.27); and sexual equalitv (s.28) are certainlv inte nded 
to fundam entally change the Constitution. Section "»2( I) entrenches, m ln  
aha, the C harter as the “. . . suprem e law of C anada . . .” Professoi Hogg 
asserts that the Constitution, which includes the C harter, is suprc-me o \et 
all laws “. . . whatever their origin; federal statutes. prov me tal statutes, com ­
mon law, pre-confederation statutes and imperial statutes . .
Two crucial questions rem ain to Ik* resolved In the Suprem e Court of 
Canada. First of all, is the prerogative exclusivelv a common law powerr 
Secondly, will all laws become subject to the C harter?
V'|d(<>mv M il l r tt r .  wtfn ii. to n ln o lr  .'<1. .it *> <
< A nnotation). supra, footn ote <0. at 7t> 
,TPet Ksan | at I 
" P e i I d ) .n n  | . ai I 
1,<Pei M arceau 22
"'H ugg (A nn oiation). supra. tool n o li id . al 10 r>
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A survey o f s tandard  authorities led M arceau |. to conclude that the 
prerogative is a special law outside the “com m on law”. While he concedes 
that the prerogative is “created and lim ited” by the com m on law," its 
operation with respect to “the governm ent o f the arm y” is excluded from 
judicial review.1- T his is less an argum ent that the entire prerogative is 
excluded f rom judicial review than it is that only a portion o f it, that dealing 
with defence and international relations, is unreviewable. M oreover. Pro­
fessor Hogg in suggesting prerogative powers will be subject to the C harter, 
omits any reference to treaty and defence powers. Is it possible to delineate 
separate areas of the prerogative? T h ere  is authority to suggest that tnere 
are two distinct prerogatives, namely ‘d irect’ and 'incidental' prerogatives:
I'he direct prerogatives are such positive substantial parts of the roval 
( haracter and authoritv. as are rooted in and spring f rom the King's |>olitit al 
person, considered m erely bv itself , without reference to any other extrinsic 
circum stance, as the right of sending am bassadors, of creating peers and  
of making war or peace. But such prerogatives as are incidental bear always 
a relation to som ething else, distinct from  the Kind's person; and are indeed  
onlv exceptions, in favour of the Crown, to those general rules that are 
established for the rest of the com m unity; such .is, that no costs shall be 
recovered against the king; that the km ^ can never be a joint-tenant; and  
that Ins debt shall l)e preferred before a debt to am  of his subjects . .
It is conceivable that the direct prerogatives would not In* subject to 
the ( ’barter. Such a result depends on the approac It of the Suprem e ( o u t I 
to the term  "governm ent" found in section '.V2. I'he historical approach, 
illustrated above l>\ the derivation ot prerogatives, max well deem treatx 
making .is part of the direc t prerogative, and outside* the ( harte t's  reac h. 
( )n the* other hand, a tunc tional approac h would see k to disc ern the esseuc e 
<>l the* activitx. regardless of its derivation:
the courts should focus on the issue of whether there is governm ental 
ac tivity, in decid ing whethei the Chat tel applies, lather than foc ussing on 
the form  thereof."
T he decision to perm it the testing was. in reality, a decision of our 
governm ent in the* interest of benefitting I.S .-C anada relations. I o in ter­
pret it as the will of an archaic sovereign is to give credence to the* regtes- 
siveness which represents the main im pedim ent to the success of the* most 
im portant reform  in the* historx of Canadian law—the C harter. Kven t! the 
Supreme* Court should sec* the decision as governm ental in charac ter. there* 
is the distinc t possibility that it max in terpret the C h atte r as applicable onlx 
in c a se s  where statute law is challenged. This would confirm out general 
notion that the C anadian judiciarx is hahituallx verx conservative.r '
‘ ( D lg f sl ' l* M 'l  t* \
* I l . i l s h u i  \  s .  /  l l . l  > « /  t  l l g l t l H l l .  \ o l  VI
“ Blat k s lo n e s  < <immrnlnnr\ Book  I al I •> ( l.« u is  t-dl lioni Kcli i i n l  In In tmul.il»'  XI I in liuiik nl \ n . u  
Si hI iti \ H m  I rt nl I * i. \  K al I t '. '
" k a l lu ' i i im  t  Svmiiidii as t i l e d  in 1.11 1 1<>|xdsks .V B ea u d o in .  Mt/tni. l o o i n o ie  In. .11 *>0
' XX I I  Xti ( o n n e ll Xniiual Nurvex o l ( an a tlian  ( o n s iii iiim n a l l.a u  i I W J i .  I t O lln .m  I n. 1 Hi .n . i  ‘»(>2 
al MM
362 t/.N.fl. /^ W  JOURN AL •  REVUE DE DROIT U.N.-B.
However, before the form ation o f the C harter, with Thorson v. A.-G. 
Canada4", a person was perm itted  to challenge the validity o f  legislation 
without having to show any harm  caused to him. This case was part o f a 
b roadening o f relief in constitutional cases, which culm inated in the passage 
o f the C harter. T he  obvious extension o f Thorson is the C h arte r’s extension 
to all law, as was suggested by C attanach J . in the present case:
It is but a short and logical step to take to conclude that in light o f the 
clear and unequivocal language o f  paragraph 32(1) a) of the Charter that 
the Charter is applicable to the Covernment o f  Canada in the event of an 
executive decision being taken which is in breach o f the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed bv the Charter.47
Hopefully, a liberal, m odern approach to the C harter will be adopted 
by the Suprem e C ourt. In spite o f the conception that ou r judiciary is 
conservative, a well-noted decision o f Eberle J. suggests otherwise: “1 think 
the C harter ought not to be in terpreted  too narrowly.’’48
SUMMARY
T he real obstacles to O peration Dismantle, Inc.’s case are in proving 
that their allegations o f fact would incite nuclear attack and the fact that 
the issues presented are inherently lion-justiciable. It is subm itted that the 
o ther im pedim ents suggested by the Federal C ourt of Appeal are  su r­
m ountable. T h e  causal link between a cabinet decision and its foreseeable 
consequences is not too rem ote. Finally, an of fensive governm ental activity 
should Ik* challengeable, irrespective of the fact that the pow er f rom which 
it em anates has an odd historical developm ent.
Com bining these factors, it would Ik- possible to prevent the govern­
ment from  delegating to a private partv the* job of spraying forests with a 
chemical deleterious to the health, and therefore to the security, of a pet son. 
For exam ple, the m other of a child could prevent the governm ent of New 
Brunswick from spraving chemicals (through the* agency of Forest Protec­
tion Ltd.) on H e r  Majesty's' forests which undouhtedlv t ause a disease sut li 
as Reyes' Syndrom e. I Ints, if the* facts be proven, the decision would be 
im pugned on the basis that: the chemicals are the cause of the disease: the 
cabinet decision allowed the* spraying of the forest In Forest Protection 
I .id.; anti despite the prerogative over Crown forests, the cabinet decision 
was a ‘governm ental activity subject to the C harter In sett ion 1) (a).
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